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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Macario Arellano, an illiterate Mexican laborer, 
LS employed by the Western Pacific Railroad Company 
: its section at Dumphy, Nevada, which is some 23 
lles east of Battle Mountain, Nevada. (T-12) o The 
1ly language which he can speak or understand is 
>anish, but he can neither read nor write his native 
>ngue. He cannot speak, read or write English~ (T-9 
L-103), (T-115), although he does understand certain; 
>rds as used with relation.ship to his railroad em-
~ o ym en t o ( T - 1 0 ) a 
>lyglot mixture. 
The section crew at Dumphy was a 
It consisted of two Mexicans, Pete 
~rez and Macario Arellano, and a Pue,rto Rican named 
:ancisco Matta, none of whom spoke any language 
lt Spanish. (T-13). The other two members of the 
·ew were Indians, Jerry Jackson, who spoke primarily 
toshone dialect and possessed a smattering of 
towledge of English, Baul Thompson, who spoke 
toshone and English (T-13), and the Foreman, Enrico 
;yva, a Spanish-American who spoke the English 
.nguage. (T-13). The Roadmaster in charge of the 
ction, whose headquarters were in Elko, Nevada, was 
vid Charlevois, who spoke English but had no 
owledge of either Shoshone or Spanisho (T-13, T-13/ 
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On the 31st. of M~rch,. 1954, Macario Arellano, 
gether with the other members of the section crew, 
e foreman and the roadmaster, went to a culvert 
proximately one mile east of the Dumphy section 
:adquarters to dump a load of rock into the culverto 
'-16). The rock was to be used as reinforcement 
I prevent a p o s s i b 1 e w a s h o u t o Upon reaching the 
.lvert, the roadmaster, Char1evois, caused the car 
, be dumped and in so d~ing the car was derailed. 
'-18). The foreman and Perez were detached from 
.e group to obtain equipment to replace the car 
1 the rails, (T-19), and Charlevois with the four 
:maining members of the crew undertook to remove 
.e rock from the right of way in order that 
affic might be resumed. (T-19, T-139). 
At that time the rocks were piled approximately 
.ree feet deep at or along the south rail. (T-20, 
21, T-122)o The pile extended southerly down the 
ade of the track bed, some of the rocks having 
11en into the culvert itse1fo The crew members 
mmenced to roll the rocks from the top of the 
1e down the grade, using bars when it was deemed 
cessaryo (T-21). 
Charlevois, the roadmaster, assumed active 
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management and control of the work, (T-139), 
notwithstanding the fact that two of the four 
men remaining understood no English, and he under-
stood no Spanish and the other members were ShoshonE 
Indians, only one of whom spoke English and neither 
spoke Spanish, while Charlevois possessed no knowlec 
of the Shoshone dialect. Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4 
provide a general picture of the area in questiono 
The exhibits show the elevated position of the 
tracks and provide in addition information as to 
the nature and extent of the slope that existed 
from the track to ~he edge of the cluvert, as well 
as the area immediately south of the culverto 
Some~orientation of the pictures is necessaryo 
All views of the culvert set forth in exhibits 1, 
2, 3, and 4 show the south side of the culvert and 
the area where the rocks lay. Exhibit 1 is a 
>icture of the culvert facing west and exhibit 4 
ls a picture of the culvert facing easto Exhibits 
~ and 3 are pictures which show substantially the 
;ame area and are pictures taken so that the top of 
:he picture would be north, the bottom south, the 
.eft hand west t:oward Battle Mountain, and the right 
.and east toward Beowaneu 
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Macario Arellano, the appellant, testified that 
the time of the accident he was standing on the 
st side of the pile along the top of the pile in 
area which he has marked with what would appear 
be an "x'', rolling stones, (figure 1, exhibit 3), 
-21, T-22, T-113) o He ~estified that he worked in 
at general area for approximately 20 minutes and 
at at the conclusion of said period the roadrnaster, 
arlevois, directed him to remove a rock on the 
ttom of the pile which was serving as a dam 
eventing the rocks from rolling down the hill. 
at the roadmaster pointed to a particular rock 
d said "roll that rock" .. (T-110). That he 
lked around the east side of the pile where there 
re no rocks down to the bottom corner of the 
le, (figure 2, exhibit 3), to a spot free from 
:k, and attempted to dislodge the rock the 
ldmas ter had designated 0 (Figure 3, exhibit 3) o 
lt he could not move that particular rock but 
:able to dislodge one immediately adjacent, and 
he did and turned to throw the rock over the 
. e , a s s [. own in the ex h i b i t s , the p i 1 e s h i f t e d 
commenced to roll down the grade. A rock struck 
in the middle of the back and knocked him 
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rer the piling into the immediate vicinity of the 
.ack marked areS: (figure_ 4, exhibit 3) o The 
pellant testified that tJle other three members 
:the crew were on the west side of the pile (T-23), 
.d that they were rolling stones in the same manner 
: had been rolling stones from the top of the pile 
d in a position of safety and that Charlevois was 
tween him and the other members of the crew and 
a distance of from 12 to 20 feet from Arellanoo 
Charlevois 1 version was entirely differento He 
ated, contrary to Arellano, that he, Charlevois, 
s on the east end of the pile and that Arellano 
son the west end of the pile. ( T -13 9 , T- 14 0 ) • 
only has a recollection of the whereabouts of 
e appellant.. He further testified that Arellano 
s unsteady on his feet and he ordered him by 
lling to get away, and that immediately there-
ter, Arellano started down the west or left side 
the pile and across the bottom of the pile, at 
Lch time he fell from the top of the culvert 
~o the rocks below in substantially the same 
!a where Are llano says he fe 11 o ( T-140, T-148). 
The whereabouts of Matta was unknown at the 
1e of trial, although he was allegedly somewhere 
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Puerto Ricoo Of the two remaining witnesses, 
ckson was called by the plaintiffo Thompson, 
e fourth witness, who was at the time of trial 
ill in the employ of the Western Pacific Railroad 
mpany, and in Salt Lake City, was not called as 
witness by the defendanto 
Jackson, one of the Indians, had not seen 
ellano from the date of his injury until he saw him 
court, and could not have conversed with him 
d he seen him, by reason of linguistic diffi-
ltieso He completely repudiated Charlevois and 
>ported Arellano's testimony in general a He testi-
~d that Arellano was on the east side of the pile 
lling rocks~ which is where Arellano testified 
was but which conflicted with Charlevois' 
~siono {T-124)o He stated that the other three 
tbers of the crew, and Charlevois, were at the 
:t end of the pile, which is where the appellant 
tified they wereo (T=l24) 8 He stated that 
hough Charlevois was standing near him, he did 
hear Charlevois yell to Arellano or anyone 
e. That he heard no commotion or statements 
il he heard someone yell, "The old man_ fell''o 
6 
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.126)o That he looked up and saw Arellano 
lng in almost the exact spot Arellano testified he 
f3lleno (T-125, T-126). He stated further he 
wo~ked with Arellano all that day; that he did 
appear to be wobbly on his feet, or ill, which 
contrary to the Charlevois versiono (T-173). 
!te is no disagreement that Arellano was injured, 
l seriously injured, although there was a con-
.ct as to the extent of the injury. Appellant 
~duced testimony that he was permanently in-
acitated for work, and again, the only independent 
ness, Miya, verified the position of the appellant' 
·sician, namely that Arellano was not capable 
doing manual work because of the condition of his 
h t arm. ( T- 3 2) . There was no conflict in the 
timony either that the defendant railroad 
reafter secured Arellano•s resignation by a 
ck and a fraud, leading him to believe he was 
ning a chit for groceries when in fact he was 
ning a resignation. (T-27, T-28), nor is there 
conflict with the fact that when Arellano was 
ised that he had, in fact, signed a resignation, 
iesired to revoke the same but that the respondent 
Lroad would not permit him to go back to worko 
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It is not denied and therefore must be held 
be admitted that: One of the jurors selected to 
y the above act ion was a man named Fe 1 ton Jones, 
0 was and is a brother of a Salt Lake City attorney 
med Shirley Jones, Jro (SuboTr.-5). During the noon 
cess of the second day of trial and on Wednesday, 
vember 9, 1955, Shirley Jones Jr. approached Mr. 
wis, one of the defense counsel, in the City and 
unty Building and asked him if the jury was outo 
answer to the statement by Lewis that the case 
s going slowly, Jones stated: ''Yes, I know all 
Jut it, I got a brother that is a juror in 
~re." That he further stated, "It's funny that 
brother gets picked for all these railroad 
;es," and requested a conference with Lewis. 
lt they thereafter conversed quietly for a short 
:iod of time in tones which the witness could 
:hear, although he did hear "That old Mexican." 
lb.Tr-5). That the witness subsequently saw 
.rley Jones, Jr. at his office. That Jones 
ognized him, stared at him and acted pretty 
Vous. (SuboTr-6 - 7). Mr. Lewis, one of defense 
nsel, ~dmitted seeing Jones during the trial. 
8 
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)ub. Tro-8) and did not deny the conversation above 
~t fortho (Sub.Tr-8)a 
The verdict was a 6-2 verdict in favor of the 
~fendant, and one of the subscribing jurors to 
lat verdict, and an essential part of that 
rdictj was Felton Jones. This same Jones had 
vised another member of the jury that he had a 
lative who was an attorney and he knew a little 
t about the law .. This is also the same Jones 
o entered the jury room and assumed the initiative 
the discussion therein, advised everyone he did 
:believe the respondent's version, that Charlevois' 
\ 
>ry was "hogwash'' but that it was his opinion 
~re was no negligence on either side and that the 
·diet should be "no cause for action" 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. That the court erred in giving its instructio 
her 12o 
2. That the court erred in refusing to give 
lntiff's proposed instruction number 3o 
3. That the court erred in refusing to give 
~ntiff's proposed instruction number 2o 
4. That the court erred in refusing to give 
9 
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11aintiff' s proposed instructions 1 and 5o 
5. That the court erred in refusing to give 
laintiff's proposed instruction number 6. 
6. That the court erred in refusing to give 
laintiff's proposed instructions 13 and l4o 
7. That the court erred in refusing to grant 
ppellant a new trial by reason of the misconduct of 
juroro 
Io THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION 12 
The almost unanimous weight of authority 
1roughout the country is to the effect that a 
Lrty is entitled to have the court instruct the 
iry on any theory or theories which he may have 
d which are supported by evidence introduced 
ring the t t ia 1. That Utah follows the majority 
le in this country is established in Startin Vo 
dsen, 237 P(2) 834, wherein the court stated: 
"The instructions should not be susceptible of 
misconstruction as either comments on the 
evidence or arguments for either side of the 
caseo It was the duty of the court to cover 
the theories of both parties in his in-
structions o" 
When a court refuses to instruct upon a theory 
a party to the trial appeals from such refusal, 
evidence in support of the theory should be 
10 
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aken 1n its strongest light in favor of such 
equestv Young Vo Carlson, 276 P(2) 23o Plaintiff 
equested an instruction on last clear chance which 
IS refused by the trial courto Plaintiff appealed 
1 the sole ground that it was prejudicial error 
>r the trial court to have refused to grant his 
~questo The Court of Appeals, in considering 
lis question, stated~ 
"It is of course the duty of the court to 
instruct on every theory of the case finding 
support in the evidenceo Daniels Vo San 
Francisco, 40 Cal. (2) 614, 255 P(2) 785; 
See also Simmer Vo San Francisco, 116 Cal. 
App. (2) 724; Doran Vo San Francisco, 127 
CaloApp.(2), 274 P(2) 464. Therefore the 
basic question is whether, interpreting 
the evidence most strongly in favor of the 
appellant, there is any reasonable basis for 
the application of the last clear chance 
doctrine. Bolton v. Martin, 126 Cal.Appo(2) 
178, 271 P(2) 99lofl 
Ten of .the appellant's proposed instructions 
.ated to his theory of the case based upon the 
ts at bar, it being appellant's theory: (1) 
t the respondent had the duty to provide a safe 
nor method for doing the work required; 
that when more than one alternative method was 
loye d, one of which is dangerous, the other of 
"''~-- is safe, that it is negligence of the .. ,_ 
,onden t not to employ the safer way; (3) 
11 
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that the respondent had the duty not to expose the 
appellant to any unnecessary risk; (4) that the 
lopellant did not assume the risk of his employment 
Lnd he was not negligent if he worked in a place 
,f danger pursuant to order; (5) that the respondent 
'as -required to take into consideration the servant': 
ge~ ignorance and ability to comprehend in issuing 
rders and that orders must be issued in a manner 
nd fashion that the servant could understand; 
6) th~t a master is held to the knowledge that a 
ervant has a duty to obey orders and that if it 
ives okders in a fashion which it knows cannot be 
tde:rstood by its servant, it is responsible for 
tjuries sustained by reason of a lack of ability 
comprehend o 
Instructions were prepared on each of the 
ove theories and presented to the court. The 
urt refused to grant a single, solitary one of 
em. No instruction was given that covered or 
rported to cover any of appellant's theory.. The 
.y instruction which was given and which would 
.ate in any manner to the right of appellant 
recover, was submitted by the respondent and 
12 
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oust be held to cover the respondent's theory of 
lppellant' s ca.seo Certainly, it cannot be said 
:o cover any of appellant 3 s theorieso This in-
Jtruction submitted by the respondent was the 
:ourt's instruction number 12 and was excepted 
.o by the appellanto In giving that instruction, 
he court withdrew two instructions prepared 
y it which although inadequate were more 
cceptable to the appellanto Instruction 12 
rovides ~ 
"You are instructed that some evidence has 
been received to the effect that plaintiff was 
in the act of loosening a stone immediately 
prior to the time that he was injuredo This 
fact, in and of itself, is not sufficient 
to prove the defendant was negligento Before 
you can find that the defendant was negligent, 
you must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant in some way 
directed plaintiff to loosen or remove a 
stone and that at said time the defendant's 
roadmaster knew, or in the exercise of reason-
able care, should have known, that the removal 
of said stone would expose plaintiff to an 
unreasonable risk of harm" 
Where, might it be asked, is any reference 
:I.e to the theory of safe method of work? 
Where does the instruction contain any refer-
:e to the duty of the employer when more than 
~method of work, one of which is dangerous, is 
13 
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available to the employer, who elects the dangerous 
~ourse? 
Where is any reference made to the doctrine of 
1nnecessa:ry risk? 
Where does the court purport to instruct 
·elative to the duty of an employer in framing and 
iving orders? 
Obviously the instruction given ignores these 
uestionso It does not purport to cover any theory 
pon which appellant based his claim of recoveryo 
The effect of the instruction is to minimize 
he direct, positive, and unequivocal testimony 
f the appellant that he was ordered and in-
tructed by the respondent's roadmaster to leave 
safe place at the top of the pile where he was 
1lling stones, and to dislodge a particular 
:one pointed to by respondent • s roadmaster, which 
s at the bottom of the pile, and that in follow-
g orders he was knocked down by a rock which 
ruck him in the backo The instruction de-
eciates and ignores appellant's theory relating 
the direction and control of his acts by the 
spondent's agent and the testimony relating 
~reto, and by inference would indicate that 
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uch testimony and theory on the part of the 
ppellant were of no consequenceo 
Respondent must be held to have knowledge of 
.ts own testimony and its own theory. Yet, the 
.nstruction requested by the respondent and given 
y the court flies squarely in the face of facts 
hich the respondent's roadmaster admitted to be 
rue, namelY that it was dangerous for anyone to 
oll a rock from the bottom of the pile or in any 
ay to get in front of the rocks as they were 
eing rolled down the slope. Respondent conceded 
lese facts to be true and offered the evidence 
:self, yet, nevertheless, the respondent made 
lowledge of these facts a fact to be found by a 
1ry preliminary to finding any possible liabilityo 
Finally, it is submitted that Instruction 12 
s erroneous when it made the sole test of lia-
lity the exposure of the appellant to an un-
asonable risk without making any effort to advise 
e jury as to how they should determine what 
reasonable risk was. 
15 
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II o .~.u,., ~ vun J:' :i,Ji~:c.:u J:~ i\E :r u 3 ING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF' S 
PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3 RELATING TO THE 
DUTY OF THE EMPLOYER TO FURNISH A SAFE PLANi·,QR 
METHOD FOR DOING THE WORK REQUIRED 
One of the basic theories of appellant was 
hat the respondent railroad as an employer had a 
uty or obligation to provide a safe method or 
.anner for doing the work required and that if 
uch duty was not met by the respondent, that it 
as guilty of negligenceo It was further 
ppellant's theory that where as here there were 
lternative methods available and especially where 
here, one way was safe and the other known to 
dangerous that it was negligence on the part of 
te employer to use or require the dangerous method 
be usedo 
at obligation, in fact, did rest upon the 
sponden t ? 
In Fisher v. Minneapolis & S.Lo Ry Co. ,199 F(2) 
!, the plaintiff was a member of a crew engaged 
unloading transmission line poles from a flat 
The poles were about 58 feet in length and 
.ghed about 3000 pounds each. While on the cars, 
poles were held in place by wires and bands. 
plaintiff climbed upon the load and cut the 
16 
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Last of the retaining bandso Not being held, the 
logs rolled free and in the confusion plaintiff was 
~illedo Plaintiff sued on the theory that a safe 
, e tho d for do in g t he work had n o t b .e en em p 1 o y e d o 
'he Circuit Court held: 
"But it cannot be questioned as to all such 
operations that a safe method must be adopted 
and proper direction and efficient tools 
supplied by anyone who contracts for and 
undertakes performanceo Q o ." 
In Jefferson Vo City of Raleigh, NoC., 140 SE 7E 
ne plaintiff was employed as a laborero In the 
)urse of his duties he was directed to take a 
Ledge and assist the foreman to cut some pile., 
te foreman held a wedge on the pipe o While en-
lged in striking the cleaver with the sledge a 
iver of steel was knocked loose, striking 
aintiff in the eye and blinding himo From a 
dgment for plaintiff, the defendant appealed. 
e Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment, 
a ted: 
"The law of the state is that an employer 
of labor is required to exercise reasonable 
care in providing reasonably safe methods 
of and means to do the worko Thus in Noble 
Vo Lumber Co. 151 NC 76, 65 SE 622 it is 
said "It is elementary learning that it is 
the duty of the master to furnish his 
servant with a reasonably safe method, so far 
17 
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as practicable, for doing his worko" 
It cannot be denied that a safe method did 
1 fact exist in the instant case and it had been 
;ed. 
Again, the court in A.T. & SF Ry Coo v. 
:ruder, 213 F(2) 250 had before it a similar 
·oblem. Plaintiff was injured while unloading 
car of the defendanto Pipe was loaded in a car 
ilt for carrying ice and perishables. The work 
s done by plaintiff, a brakeman, and a head 
akeman. To unload, plaintiff took the forward 
d of a bundle and carried it to the rear corner 
the car for the purpose of shortening the 
!t:lap beyond the doorwayo In order to get his 
I of pipe through the door, he was obligated to 
:t the bundle to a position well over his head 
.le the other man held the rear end close to the 
or. In the exercise of twisting to accomplish 
task, plaintiff suffered injury to his back. 
The court found: 
"The theory of the suit is that the carrier 
was negligent in causing heavy pipe of such 
length to be placed in a car of the character 
and dimensions of the ~eefer, rather than in 
a flat car, or a gondola, or a box car; and 
18 
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that appellee sustained his injury in con= 
sequence thereofc 
"(1) Appellant calls attention to admissions 
of the appellee and of Scott to the effect 
that there was "nothing wrong with the inside 
of the car = no slush, mud, or slippery 
substance on the floor or any shortcomings 
of that sort", hence it is said there was 
admittedly no failure on appellant's part to 
furnish appellee with a safe place to worko 
Of course, the reefer was not, per se, unsafeo 
Whether unsafe or no was a matter dependent 
on the nature of the freight carriedo Cfo 
Blair Vo Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Coo, 323 
U.S. 600, 65 SoCto 545, 89 L.Edo 490. The 
car afforded no hazard to the loading or un-
loading of package or other freight which could 
without substantial difficulty be put through 
the doorso But the jury might have reasonably 
found that it was neither suitable nor safe 
for the handling of the lengthy bundle of 
heavy pipe appellee was obliged to wrestle 
with in the manner heretofore indicated. 0 o" 
Here the plan or method of doing the work 
s found to be unsafeo The area was found to be 
fe, something that cannot be said of the area 
question here - yet the court upheld liability 
on the theory that the carrier could be held 
able because it could be found that it was 
~ligent in loading its freight cars with freight 
1 t c 0 u 1 d. no ·:: :) e u ::.1 1 o ad e d w i thou t u nne c e s sa r y or 
·easonable st:raino In other words, the carrier 
osed ln unnecessary risk upon the plaintiffo 
Here the. uses of an improper method of trans-
1 q 
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•ortatlon ana 1oaa1.ng came under scrutinyo The 
~ail:road was found negligent in not using a car 
:hat could have bee.n unloaded with safetyo There 
, ms no thing w r on g w i t h the c a r or the f r e i g h t , 
e~ se, but when improperly mixed, the witches' 
roth resulting produced injury for which the 
arrier was 1 iab leo 
The plaintiff in Khan Vo S.P. Co., Cal, 
82 P(2) 78 sued for a loss of eye due to retinal 
etachment which he alleged was the result of 
rauma and that the trauma resulted from his eye 
aing struck by a particle of concrete dislodged 
:-om a concrete floor when a heavy piece of steel 
~11 against the floor near where he was working . 
. aintiff was moving couplers from a disorganized 
.le three or four feet high which had been un-
aded by a magnetic crane. The couplers were 
ing moved by hand trucks o Plaintiff was 
rking on the project which required not only 
ving those couplers on the ground but those on 
e pi leo While engaged in lifting a coupler, 
other fell and slid from the pile and struck 
~ concreteo Defendant appealed from a judgment 
20 
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~ plaintiffo T.he ~purt.. sustain~d the verdict, 
ing: 
"We think the jury from. the evidence could 
reasonably infer that appellant was guilty of 
n gligence in sending respondent to work in 
the way and in the place describedo It was 
reasonably fore~ee~ble that·if a workman were 
engaged close to the disorderly pile of 
couplers in moving the couplers from the 
pile and upending them to be carted away by 
the hand truck, some of the couplers, during 
the operation, might fall or roll from the 
pile and strike either the workman or the 
concrete and cause injury to hima The jury 
could conclude that these heavy steel 
objects with their irregular conformation 
would be beyond the capacity of one man to 
handle with safety when they were piled as 
they wereo Certainly the jury could say 
that if one started to slip from the top of 
the pile the workman could do nothing to 
prevent its fall and since he was required 
to work close to the pile he could well be 
injuredo Further, they could say that when 
an edged steel joist weighing as much as did 
these couplers struck a concrete surface 
particles of concrete might be projected 
with great speed and that it was reasonably 
foreseeable that such a particle could strike 
a destructive blow to an eyeball if it hit 
ito We think the haphazard high piling of 
these couplers upon a concrete surface, the 
sending of the respondent to work in moving 
and disturbing the couplers on the pile in 
close proximity to the pile, when considered 
in connection with the great weight qf these 
objects~ added up to negligent conduct on 
the part of appellant, and that the evidence 
substantially supports the conclusion by the 
jury that by the falling of the coupler and 
the blow to appellant 8 s eye such damage as 
that blow inflicted was proximately caused 
by that negligence." (Underlining added) 
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In the case at bar there was nothing to foresee 
he respondent admitted that working in front of the 
ock pile was dangerous o 
Oklahoma recognizes the ruleo In Jay Vo Pope, 
klao, 53 P(2) 683, which was followed in Enid 
ransfer & Storage Co., !nco v. Mollenhauer, 
51 P(2) 1068, the plaintiff was the widow of a 
an employed by the defendant as a band shover at 
compress used by the defendant to bale cotton. 
1e decedent was caught and dragged in to the 
>mpresso The plaintiff claimed defendant was 
~gligent because it failed to provide a safe method 
1r doing the work. Her claim was granted and on 
peal the Supreme Court affirmed her position, 
ying: 
"It is the master's duty to provide a reasonably 
safe method for the performance of servants 
work and this duty is non-delegable. The 
neglect of this duty imposes a liability 
for resulting injuryo Cosden Pipe Line Co. 
v. Berry, 89 Oklao 237, 210 P 141. There1~was 
sufficient evidence for the consideration of 
the jury as to the primary negligence of the 
defendant in the case in failing to provide 
a safe method of operating the press. n 
August v. Texas N.D. Ry Coo, Texas, 265 SW(2) 
l. Plaintiff sued for injuries sustained while 
:ting car couplings by hand while engaged in 
lacing journal boxeso Plaintiff was lifting 
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ouplers so each could be inserted under it for 
he pu~pose of lifting the end of the caro 
udgment for the defendant was sustained, but in 
o doing the court stated: 
"The common law principle that the master is 
under the primary and non-delegable duty to 
use reasonable care in providing a sufficient 
number of persons to do the particular piece 
of work on hand, or in providing reasonably 
safe means and methods of work appears to 
be also fully accepted as a part of our 
fidual perisprudenceo" 
Millett v. Main Cent. R. Co. (Maine) 146 A 903. 
laintiff sued for injury to his eye and alleged 
lat the method of keeping right of way free from 
~ass by burning was actionable negligence as to 
laintiff who was injured by a spark striking his 
re. Judgment was for the defendant. The court 
lid: 
"An employer is bound to exercise ordinary care 
to provide reasonably safe and reasonably 
suitable methods,and such only, to enable the 
employee to do his work as safely as the II 
hazards incident to employment will permit." 
Io THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF's 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2 RELATIVE TO THE DUTY OF 
THE EMPLOYER TO USE THE SAFER OF TWO AVAILABLE 
METHODS ESPECIALLY WHEN ONE OF THE AVAILABLE 
METHODS WAS DANGEROUS 
As we have seen, it is incumbent upon an 
,loyer to provide a safe method of accomplishing 
21 
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ts work. In a proper case, however, this may 
~quire a selection of methods or a determination 
E which of several - two or more - alternative 
~thods should be employed. It can, of course, 
! maintained that this is included within the 
>ligation to provide a safe method and to a 
~rtain extent this must be considered, however 
lere, as here, alternative methods do exist, one 
:which was dangerous and the other safe, the 
.termination or the employment or selection of a 
fe method must also be consideredo Thus, it is 
bmitted that the correct rule is as laid down 
Boston & M.RoR. Co. Vo Meech, 1 Cir. 156 
2) 109. A train was backing slowly, the bell 
s ringing and the lights were one However, the 
istle was not blown nor was anyone assigned to 
ep watch., The court pointed out that although 
~ train was operated in its customary and usual 
lneit', more care could have been taken and that 
:h was enough to raise a jury question. 
This view was confirmed in Stone v. NY Chicago 
:t. Louis Ry Co., 344 US 407, 97 L. Edo 441, 
S.Cto 358o Plaintiff was a railroad laborer 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
0 claimed damages under the Federal Employers' 
ability Act for a back injury sustained in 
11 ing ties o Evidence of three other ways or 
thods of tie removal were introduced differing 
:>m the one complained of. The plaintiff had 
)tested that he was doing all he could. The 
,reme Court of Missouri held that no cause of 
:ion was proved. However, the Supreme Court of 
United States reversed, stating: 
"We think that the case was peculiarly one 
for the jury. The standard of care is negli-
genceo The question is what a reasonable 
and prudent man would have done under the 
circumstances. Wilkinson Vo McCarthy, 336 
US 53, 93 LoEd. 497, 69 S.Cto 413. The straw 
boss had had additional men to put on the 
tongs. He also had three alternative methods 
for removing stubborn tieso This was not 
the first difficult tie encountered by the 
section crew in this stretch of track. The 
likelihood of injury to men pulling or lifting 
beyond their capacity is obvious. Whether the 
straw boss in light of the risks should have 
used another or different method to remove 
the tie or failing to do so was culpable is 
the issue. To us, it appears to be a de-
batable issue on which fair minded men would 
differo" 
And again: 
"The fact that the employee commanded to do the 
act that caused the injury first protested 
does not place the risk of injury on him. 11 
25 
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In Ch~cago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry Coo Vo 
ight, Okla., 278 P(2) 830, plaintiff was a section 
ployee under the direction of the foremano He 
d four others were directed to remove some tieso 
ey got three sets of tongs and in the process of 
agging a tie to place and in lifting it into 
sition the tong slipped, causing plaintiff to be 
rown to the right of way. One of plaintiff's 
!aries was based upon the failure to provide a 
Lsonably safe manner or place for doing the worko 
court said: 
"A number of witnesses testified that pulling 
or dragging a rail along the right of way with 
tongs was an improper method to do the work, 
and that a better and safer way would be to 
roll the rail along the track with the use of 
tongs. 
"Wheeler, the foreman, although denying that 
the rail was dragged fifteen to twenty-five 
feet, admitted that if so handled it was an 
improper way to make the installation in 
questiono 
"We are of the view that the evidence was 
sufficient to go to the jury on the question 
of whether the defendant failed to exercise 
reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe 
manner or plan for the doing of the work. 
Also, whether the defendant exercised 
reasonable care to provide safe tools with 
which the work was to be done, and whether the 
number of employees were sufficient to do the 
work in a proper and safe manner o The jury's 
finding of negligence and causation are thus· 
sustained. 
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Huskey Vo Heine Safety Boiler Coo, Moo, 
1 SW 104lo. Plaintiff was ordered to place a 
lt in a smoke stack by his foreman, who knew that 
15 to 20 minutes a platform would be built, so 
at the bolt could have been placed with safetyo 
ile plaintiff was attempting to place the bolt, 
fello Judgment for the defendant was reversedo 
: court said: 
We think that the rule which has been an-
nounced a number of times in this state and 
which was applied by the court in the case of 
Iognus v. Packing Coo, 185 Mo. at pp 99, 
170 SW 675 is applicable to this case; the 
rule being that if two ways are open to a 
person to use,one safe and the other dangerous, 
the choice of the dangerous way with knowledge 
of the danger constitutes negligence. This 
rule has been generally applied to servants 
where they have been held to have been guilty 
of contributory negligence, but we can see 
no reason why it should not apply as well 
to the mastero In this case, the master in 
getting the bolt put in the hole had two ways 
openo One was to order the servant to put it 
there, as the testimony tended to show was 
done in this case, before the platform was 
erected, and under the circumstances this was 
a dangerous and hazardous way. The other was 
to wait a short time before giving the order 
until after the platform was built, a compara= 
tively safe way. And by adopting the unsafe 
way while there was a safe way open must 
necessarily leave the question open for the 
triers of fact to determine whether a prudent 
master would have given the order that the 
testimony of plaintiff tends to show was 
giveno 
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Brown v o Co 1 e y, Miss o , 15 2 S o 6 1 o Case whe!'e 
>loyee failed to use funnel to pour gas into 
:hine aml was burnedo 
The court said: 
"·oooand if the master expressly and affirma-
tively order the servant to omit the safe 
method and to do the work in a dangerous 
way he has waived, or rather has usurped the 
duty otherwise resting on the servant, and 
to use a common term, he is estopped to 
assert that the duty to avoid the obvious 
danger was upon the servant unless the danger 
was so imminent that no person of ordinary 
prudence should encounter it, even under 
orders." 
E. J. O'Brien & Co. Vo Shelton's Admino, Kyo~ 
sw ( 2) 3 52 . Defendant employed plaintiff's 
estate to assist in wrecking a tobacco ware-
sea Defendant ordered the intestate to climb up 
the framing in the inside of the building and 
:k off the iron sheeting with a crowbaro 
Le sitting astride the block, it gave wayo 
court said: 
"While the master cannot be held liable fo:r 
failing to furnish a safe place when the 
place itself is being demolished or repaired, 
yet if he adopts a method for doing the work 
which is hazardous when a safer method is 
available and the employee is injured by r~ason 
of the master's failure to adopt a safer 
method, the master is liableo 
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On the basis of the law heretofore cited, it 
submitted that appellant 9 s requested instruction 
nber 2 should have been granted in that there is 
d was ample evidence to support giving of the 
struction, and that the same was not covered or 
:luded with any reasonable or proper interpreta-
>n in Instruction Noo 12 given by the courto 
. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT THE MASTER IS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
IF IT EXPOSES ITS EMPLOYEES TO AN UNNECESSARY 
RISK AND THAT SUCH DUTY CANNOT BE DELEGATED 
It has long been the rule that the duty 
.ced upon an employer to furnish a safe place to 
k includes within its terms the duty not to 
ose its employees to any unnecessary risko 
s is a common law rule and it is not new, or the 
ult of statutory legislation such as the Federal 
loyerst Liability Acto 
Thus, in Terrell Vo City of Washington, NoC., 
SE 888, the plaintiff was employed by the 
endant as a lineman with the operation of its 
:trical planto On the day of his injury, 
lntiff was ordered to climb one of the poles 
the purpose of removing or repairing a wirea 
.e he was on top of the pole, it fell, causing 
?Q 
I 
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e plaintiff serious injurieso Evidence showed that 
e pole was rotten and in bad condition sever~l 
ches under the groundo Judgment was for the 
aintiffo The court affirmed, saying: 
"The master fails to supply a rtsafe place 
for work if he allows work to be conducted 
there habitually in a manner needlessly 
dangerous to the servantso" 
Later in Tate Vo Standard Mirror Coo, NoCo, 
SE 328, the same court in discussing the charge 
the trial court affirmed the rule in these 
"Without dissecting the charge and examining 
in in detail, it is sufficient to say that 
the court charged fully and correctly on the 
first issue and in accordance with the 
principle we have stated and which is thus 
epitomized in Smith Vo Baker, AC 352: 
"An employer is bound to carry on his opera-
tions so as not to subject those employed by 
him to unnecessary risk and he is no less 
responsible to his workmen for personal 
injuries occasioned by a defective system of 
using machinery than for injuries caused by 
a defect in the machinery itselfo~ 
The same problem was before the court in the 
ant case of Great A&P Tea Coo v o McConnell, 
lr. 199 F(2) 569o There the plaintiff injured 
back in an attempt to move a heavy meat block 
:he course of her duties in washing down the 
.s of defendant's meat shop o She claimed 
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fendan t was neg 1 igen t in fai 1 ing to supply 
3quate help to assist plaintiff in moving the 
>Ck~ The Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming 
lgmen t for the p 1 a inti f f » said : 
"The master owes his servant certain in-
alienable non-assignable duties peculiar to 
the relationship based in general upon the 
duty not to expose him to unnecessary or 
unreasonable riskso" 
A similar rule is found· in Williams Vo City of 
~kane, Washington, 131 P 833, which was an action 
damages for injuries sustained in the erection 
a b:ridgeo The defendant was constructing bridge 
rs, and as plaintiff was engaged in loosening 
forms and without knowledge that only three 
•I 
s were imbed~ed in the pier, he shoved out the 
m and because the rods could not hold it, they 
the plaintiff fell into the rivero Defendant 
ealed from a judgment for the plaintiff, but the 
:t upheld the verdict, saying: 
"That it is the duty of the master to exercise 
reasonable care to furnish the servant a 
reasonably safe place of work, and to keep 
that place reasonably safe, is law so 
familiar as to require no citation of sus-
taining authorityo In tre prosecution of an 
inherently dangerous enterprise reasonable 
care is care commensurate with the danger 
reasonably to be anticipatedo In such a case 
reasonable care "means great careo" 1 
Labatt, Master & Servant, Para 16, po 30; 
Spr~o-n•" N~'L7 Vn1r'll- & N .. E"R" Coo, 68 Conno345, 
'II 
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36 A'C.Lo /'Jl, :J/ L.K.Ao 638; · 1 Thompson on 
negligence, para 25o" 
And again-~ 
"This is espec.ially true as applied to the 
plan or method of operation deliberately 
adopted by the master or his representatives. 
When the plan is inherently defective and 
unnecessarily dangerous, its adoption is 
negligence entailing a liability upon the 
master for resulting injuries. Jobe v. 
Spokane Gas & Fuel Co., 131 Paco 235, just 
decided; Ball v. Megrath, 43 Washo 107, 109, 
86 Pac .. 382; Blair Vo Spokane, 66 Wash. 399, 
405, 119 Pac. 839; Etheridge Vo Gordon 
Constr. Co., 62 Washo 256, 259, 260, 113 
Pac. 639; Rogers Vo Valk, 131 Pac .. 231, just 
decided; 1 Labatt, Master & Servant, para 118." 
In Smith v .. Southern Illinois & Missouri Bridge 
Mo. 30 SW(2) 1077 , plaintiff was employed 
a watchman on a bridge. The tracks on the bridge 
e being repaired and considerable material was 
:ed on the bridge walk-way between the trackso 
le on the bridge plaintiff saw an approaching 
.n and started to walk across the tracks to 
on another track and out of the way of the 
.n. He slipped on the materials which caused 
to fall and be struck by the traino Plaintiff 
med the leaving of the loose wires and other 
rials lying around render~d the place unsafe 
dangerous. Judgment was affirmed by the 
t, which held: 
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"Under the instructions given, and under the 
custom and practice shown, that the watchman, 
on the approach of a train, for his own safety 
should cross over to the other track, the 
leaving of loose wire or wires connected with 
materials lying between the tracks was an 
undue enhancement of the dangers to which 
plaintiff and others in like employment were 
exposed. No sort of warning light was placed 
upon or about any of these materialso The 
performance of plaintiff's duties, under the 
circumstances shown, was attended with dangero 
Under the duty of the master to exercise 
ordinary care to furnish the servant a 
reasonably safe place to work, there is inclu-
ded the duty co use all reasonable precautions 
which ordinary prudence would dictate, under 
the particular circumstances, in respect to 
the dangers to be reasonably anticipated and 
likely to occur to the servant in the course 
of the discharge of his duties .. " 
And finally, in Simmons Vo Doublet & Ewin, 
, 14 5 S 7 0 8 , the son of. p 1 a inti f f died w hi 1 e 
king under a pile driver used by the defendant 
the erection of piling necessary for the 
lding of the State Capitol buildingo Judgment 
plaintiff was affirmed by the court, stating~ 
"The general rule is that a master must provide 
a reasonably safe place to work and must see 
that he is not exposed to unnecessary risks in 
the course of his employment." 
In Yarber v .. Chicago & A .. Ry Co., 85 NE 928, 
~ntiff sued defendant on the grounds that the 
.oyer failed to furnish a safe place in which to 
~and for the additional reason that the foreman 
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one of a gang engaged in removing two box cars 
istance of 40 feeto The cars rested on posts 
ause the trucks had been removedo Having 
ten the bars in position, they were raised on 
ks and beer kegs were placed under the west end 
the car to hold it up., One of the kegs fell 
plaintiff was ordered under the car to set 
the keg, when the car on the jacks fell and 
"'as caught and injuredo The court stated in 
t as follows: 
"While the requirement that the place in which 
the work must be considered in connection with 
the fact that the w9rk was necessarily 
attended with some danger, yet it is the duty 
of the master to use reasonable care to see 
that the servant is not unnecessarily exposed 
to danger in doing his work. If the master 
negligently gives an order, in obeying which 
the servant is exposed to danger which he 
would not otherwise have encountered, the 
master may be held liable for an injury 
suffered by the servant o" 
Can this duty be delegated or transferred? It 
d be possible on this ·point to fill~this brief 
cases unanimously affirming the fact that the 
to provide a safe place to work which rests 
the employer cannot be delegatedo It is 
ested, however, that perhaps the phraseology 
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Butz Vo Union Paco Ro Coo, 233 P(2) 332 shows as 
i!&rly as any the universality of the tule: 
"It is settled beyond question that it is the 
duty of the employer to exercise reasonable care 
to furnish his employees a reasonably safe 
place to work and this includes situations 
where the employer sends his employee on the 
premises of another to perform his dutieso 
2 Sherman & Redfield on Negligence, Revised 
Edition, Sections 193 and 202; Albert Miller 
& Coo Vo Wilkins, 7 Ciro, 209 F. 582; Porter 
v9 Terminal R. Assn of Sto Louis, 327 Illo 
App o 645, . 65 N. Eo 2d, 31, 33 o In the latter 
case the court referred to that duty and 
stated the proposition very clearly "* * * 
and this duty follows the Master even though 
the servant is sent upon the premises of 
another to do his worko This duty is non-
delegable and affirmative, and must be 
continuously fulfilled and positively per-
formed", citing supporting authoritieso 11 
It is submitted that the trial court erred in 
using to instruct the jury in accordance with 
intiff's requested instructions numbered 1 and So 
rHE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY 
rHAT THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF HIS 
~MPLOYMENT AND THAT HE WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN 
~ONTINUING TO WORK KNOWING THAT HE WAS REQUIRED 
ro WORK IN A DANGEROUS OR UNSAFE PLACE 
The Congress of the United States, on August 11, 
t, amended the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
in particular Section 54 thereof, to provide 
: employees should not be held to have assumed 
risk of their employment in any case where 
35 
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•• I 
ury or death resulted in whole or in part from 
negligence of an officer, an agent, or an 
loyee of a common carrier. 
It has long been the law in Utah that one is 
ligent to require an employee to perform a 
gerous acto Tuckett v .. American Steam & Hand 
ndry, 84 P 500. Equally long, indeed from the 
e case, it has been established that an employee 
not held-guilty of negligence because he places 
self in a dangerous position by reason of his 
ying an order. Thus we find Judge Howell, 
aking for the court, saying: 
"If the order of the master constitutes an act 
of negligence, and if the servant obeys it, 
and by reason of such obedience is injured, 
he can count upon such an act of negligence 
when he brings an action to recover for his 
injury. In order, however, to recover, he 
must show that the obeying of the order was 
the proximate cause of the injury." 
The court went on to quote with approval the 
Lowing language of Labatt, Master and Servant, 
:ion 439: 
"It follows from what has been said that even 
if we might have said that the plaintiff did 
not act with that carefulness which every one 
is legally bound to exercise. If no order 
had been given by the master to act just as 
she did, the giving of such an order prevents 
us from saying so. 
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The views CQntained therein were affirmed in 
am v . 0 g den Packing & Pro vi s ion in g C o . , 1 7 7 P 2 18 o 
din more recent years, the court has adopted the 
me position in Kaumans v., White Star Gas & Oil Coo, 
P(2) 231: 
"We are likewise of the opinion that the 
evidence fails to establish as a matter of 
law that plaintiff was negligent in obeying 
defendant's orders because of the danger 
necessarily involved in the work ordered 
doneo It is well settled that a servant is 
not negligent in obeying the directions of 
his employer or superior unless the danger 
involved was" 'so absolute and imminent that 
injury must almost necessarily' have resulted 
to him by following" such directions. Toone v o 
J.O. O'Neill Canst. Co., 40 Utah 265, 121 P 
10, 16; Fowler Vo Union Portland Cement Co., 
39 Utah 363, 117 P 462; Pascoe v. Nelson, 
52 Mont. 405, 158 P 317; Storey v. Williams 
Bros., !nco (Mo.Appo) 50 SW(2) 698. The 
mere fact that the servant was aware that he 
was exposing himself to danger does not make 
him guilty of contributory negligence. Toone 
v. J.O. O'Neill Canst. Co., supra; Neitzke 
v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc., 214 Wis. 441 
2 5 3 NW 5 7 9 o " 
These views have been contended and affirmed 
the courts in liability action cases. Thus 
see in S c h i r r a v 0 D • L .,..& W T R y C o . , 1 0 3 Fe d . Sup p ., 8 12 • 
inti££ was employed as a machinist and on 
ober 25, 1950 was engaged with others in moving 
engine from a stall where it was being repairedo 
las necessary to raise the engine and place rails 
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.1.. .:a.\; g en~r a J.. :co reman told the assistant 
reman to jack up the wheelso The latter went to 
e plaintiff artd ask·ed -him how he got about that 
d plaintiff suggested placing a block and jack 
raise it and then putting dead rails to cross 
e pito Plaintiff was then told to come .to the 
gineo During the operation plaintiff suggested 
ey needed more stability and the assistant 
reman said to hurry it up, and plaintiff said 
K." "Jack it up"o In the process, a piece used 
a level on top of the jack slipped out of place 
d injured plaintiff. 
Defendant claimed the plaintiff solely 
~ligent because he gave the order to jack it 
, and that he could not shift the responsibility 
the defendant, and that he acted voluntarily. 
The court held not so. That it was not the 
.sing of the jack that caused the trouble, but 
! failure to level the blockingo That the claim 
~t plaintiff was acting voluntarily was another 
of saying that he assumed the risk which 
ense was outlawed by statuteo 
d : 
38 
Finally, it 
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"In the instant case, though there was no 
testimony of an express command by Wrable to 
the plaintiff to continue on the job despite 
plaintiff's apprehension of the danger 
involved, nevertheless the plaintiff could 
reasonably infer the same from the position of 
the parties and the circumstances involved, 
p~~ticularly in view of Wrable's statement, 
"It will be all right when the weight is 
ono 11 "We haven't got much timeo We want to 
get the engine out of here tonighto" 
The doctrine is recognized by the Supreme 
u r t. o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s o In Blair Vo B&O 
C®o » supra, the court said: 
"It is true that petitioner undertook to do 
the work after he had complained to the company 
that the pipe should not be moved in the. manner 
it was. But he was commanded to go ahead by 
his superiorso Under these circumstances, it 
cannot be held as a matter of law that he 
voluntarily assumed all the risks of injuryo 
The court below cited by way of comparison 
its holding in a former decisiono Guerierro 
Vo Reading Coo, 346 P 187, 29 A(2) 510. 
There it had announced the rule that an 
employee has a duty to quit his job rather 
than do something which he knows or ought to 
know is dangerouso This court does not apply 
the doctrine of assumption of risk so 
rigorously." 
Since that decision, the doctrine of assumption 
risk was abolished by statutory amendment. 
·ely, plaintiff's position cannot be held to be 
se than it was before the enactment of the 
tutea 
That is not the lawa 
39 
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In Pritt Vo ·western Virginia Northern Ry Co., 
va., 51 SE(2) 105, the court said: 
• 
"The plaintiff herein was under the direction 
of the conducter of the train and when he was 
ordered by the conducter to place the Norfolk 
& Western car under the tipple it was his 
obligation to bbey that order, and he did soo 
Apparently no one realized the danger that 
was involved in the direction of the conducter 
to plaintiff until it was too late to avoid 
the accident. If it be contended that the 
plaintiff should have observed the danger 
and that he assumed the risk, we are met by 
Title 45, U.S.C.A., Seca 54 which provides 
ambng other things that such employee shall 
not be held to have assumed the risks of h~ 
employment in any case where such injury or 
death resulted in whole or in part from the 
negligence of any of the officers, agents or 
emp 1 o y e e s of such carrier ... 0 o n 
Finally, we submit Ericksen Vo S.P. Co. 
ll), 246 P(2) 692o Plaintiff, an employee, sued 
~ injuries sustained on the premises of another. 
Lintiff was a tee inspector and was hurt while 
:pecting tees on the premises of a lumber company 
had piled tees on the edge of the dock. He 
previously had difficulty and hAd complained 
his supervisoro The defendant contended that 
ce plaintiff had knowledge and that the pre-
es were not in its control, that it was not 
bleo The court disagreed: 
40 
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"The plaintiff's knowledge of the unsafe 
condition of the premises does not relieve 
the defendant of liability. Since 1939 the 
defense of assumption of risk has been barred 
under the Acto 45 U.S.C Ao 54. No subsequent 
decision has been cited which as a matter of 
law relieves an employer from liability due 
to dangers known to the employer simply 
because those dangers were also known to 
the employee o '' 
And again: 
"The question therefore is whether the 
defendant is liable under the Act when it 
knowingly required the plaintiff to work 
on unsafe premises of a third party and the 
employee also knew of the danger. State 
court ~ecisions in applying common law 
principles are not controlling in the 
presence of a clear and plain duty under the 
acto It may be assumed that the common law 
non-liability doctrine in the absence of 
direct control applies where the employer has 
no notice or knowledge of unsafety or dangero 
But a conclusion of non-liability under the 
act where the employer requires the employee 
to work on premises known by the employer to 
be unsafe would amount to disapproval of the 
authorities which have recognized liability 
in such cases. No exception is made when 
the employee also knows of the unsafe con-
dition but has no alternative except to work 
in the place of dangero The benefits of the 
Act are not to be withheld in contravention 
of the plain intent of the act and contrary 
to its application in other caseso To do 
so would be to permit employers, otherwise 
subject to the act, with impunity to require 
their employees to work in places of known 
danger, so long as the unsafe premises-are 
not under the employer's direct controlo 
In cases of known dangerous prem~ses be-
longing to the third party, the absence of 
direct control does not absolve the defendant 
from liability under the acto" 
41 
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It is respectfully submitted that the trial 
rt erred in refusing to give plaintiff's re-
sted instruction number 6o 
VIa THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 
13 AND 14 
The respondent had no theory except that 
raced in Charlevois' story that he waved his 
and shouted "Get out" to the appellant and that 
reafter appellant started on a perilous journey 
his own. Apparently the theory was that if 
• 
appellant could not hear or understand and 
a result of these deficiencies was injured, 
t the responsibility was his and his alone. 
This is a version that a jury could in the 
ence of correct instructions apply to the 
allant' s theory. A jury could come to the 
~lusion that appellant merely thought he was 
!red to pull the rock from the bottom of the 
~and that by reason of his misconstruction of 
supervisor's orders, he was injuredo 
Neither the court nor the respondent en-
'ored to correct this misconception. The 
!llant endeavored to do so but his requested 
.ructions were refused .. 
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The dif·ficulty with respondent's theory is that 
a. ssumes too muc.hc It assumes that an employee 
, full and complete responsibility to hear, 
lerstand and obey any order or command given him 
a sup erior, even though he be deaf, dumb and 
nd, and that having given an order or command 
employer can sit complacently and smugly by -
t~cted from all the consequences that flow 
m an order~ It assumes that in issuing an 
er there is no duty imposed upon the giver to 
e it clearly, to see that it is heard and 
erstood, to take into consideration the 
ilties or infirmities of the person to whom it 
siven or to realize that some response is obli-
): y upon its recipient and to guard against 
1gful ambiguity or incomprehensibility. 
The ~espondent's roadmaster was an intelli-
:, capable person who had risen from the ranks of 
,mmon labor e r to that of Assistant Division 
.nee-r. His intellect ~nd ability must have 
· far above the average employee .. He we1s the 
est ranking officer of the respondent on the 
eQ The ro~dmaster knew of his own language 
43 
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mitations. He expressed some doubt as to 
milar limitations on the part of the appellant 
d his co-employees, and this doubt alone should 
ve given him pauseo However, it is submitted 
at when this doubt is weighed in consideration of 
1 the facts that the mist of doubt dissolves 
d the fact of knowledge appearso 
All of the men on the crew had been employees 
the respondent for a considerable period of 
neo The roadmaster was in direct and personal 
arge of all the section crews in his area. 
>ellant's foreman, Leyva, was personally re-
>nsible to himo He was in charge on the ground 
all operations in his area similar to that 
.ng conducted that day by his men. He paid, or 
:ued the pay checks, directly to the men. He 
, present and he heard Leyva address the em-
yees in the Spanish language, which would have 
n an obviously unnecessary act if the employees 
e conversant with Englisho Finally, as a sort 
superintendent or officer in charge, he and the 
pondent must be held to have had knowledge of 
nature, character, abilities and type of person 
er his immediate jurisdiction and controlo It 
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d be absurd to contend that he had no knowledge 
he language limitations of his Indian, Mexican 
Spanish subordinateso 
Notwithstanding these facts, he permitted the 
• 
supervisory employee who could readily commu-
te with his men to depart from the scene and 
he assumed the active direction and control 
1e work when he knew that he lacked means of 
Jnication with his meno 
It is well established law that a master may 
!ld responsible for negligence in the giving 
rders. As is stated in "Naval Leadership",. 
c:t of the U o S Naval Academy: 
"The giving of a command requires a commander 
to speak with assurance, firmness, in a clear 
tone of voic~, and loudly enough so that every 
man who is expected to execute that command 
can hear." 
The Naval Watch Officers' Guide, another 
lard Navy pub 1 i cation , states : 
"The manner in which you give commands is 
important. Speak clearly, loud enough to be 
heard, and with a positive, incisive voiceo" 
Speaking specifically, they make the additional 
ment: 
"Nowhere in the Navy is exact phraseology as 
45 
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important as it is to the conning officer in 
giving commands to the helmsman or engine 
order telegraph watch, because misunder-
standings or ambiguity can be so quickly 
disastrous there must be no possibility of 
a mistaken meaning o" 
These rules would seem to be so self-evident 
10 t to admit to any argument that the rules are 
! for military personnel but have no place in 
:yday lifeo It would seem so simple as to 
1ire no explanation that an order or a command 
1ot a command unless the recipient can hear and 
~rstand that a command is being given and that 
~s being directed to him. 
Labatt, Master and Servant, Section 1159, 
lking of the sufficiency of the warning states·~ 
"The extent of the master's obligation in 
regard to imparting information to a servant 
is to give him such instruction as will 
enable him to avoid injury. If the master 
relies on the fact that he admonished the 
servant of the danger which caused the 
injury, he must show that the warning was 
timely and explicito Merely going through 
the form of giving instructions is not 
sufficient o" 
Indeed, if an order is not understood, it has 
:ffect as an ordero 
In Upton Vo Conway Lumber Co., NoH., 128 A 802 
dgment in favor of plaintiff was affirmed ~n the 
nd among others that proper warnings or in-
ction ourt said: 
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"It is undoubtedly true that the servant must 
show, inferentially at least, that his ignoranc® 
is justifiable under the circumstanceso Camire 
Vo Laconia Car Coo 1l 79 NoHo 531Sl 11 Ao 340o 
But this is far from saying that he must elu-
cidate in advance every conceivable circum~ 
stance which might tend to endow him with 
knowledge. It is not necessary for him uto 
assert his ignorance in te:rms" (Bjork Vo U.,So 
Bobbin & Shuttle Coo, 79 N.Ho 402, 406, 111 A. 
284, 533), nor is his lack of knowledge ard 
appreciation inexcusable merely because express 
warning and instruction have been giveno In 
all cases the warning or instruction must be 
sufficient~.~o fully inform the servant of 
dangero Willis Vo Plymouth & Compton Telo 
Exch. Coo, 75 N.Ho 453, 455, 75 Ao 877, 30 
LoR.Ao (NoS.) 477 o But if instead of re-
ceiving instruction from the master, he 
obtains through other channels sufficient 
knowledge to understand and appreciate his 
peril, he cannot recovero Paige Vo Coo 80 
NoH. 439, 119 A. 303o On the other hand, there 
are occasions where any warning the master may 
give is insufficiento Richardson Vo Adams, 
77 N.H. 571, 94 A. 967." 
The same result was reached by the Supreme Court 
·isconsin in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Iron 
reWorks, 129 NW 6l5o The problem involved was 
tantially the same and again in affirming a 
ment for the plaintiff, the court held: 
"An insufficient w.arning is in legal effect 
equivalent to no warningo McDougall v. 
Ashland, etc .. , Co., 97 Wiso 387, 73 N .W. 327; 
Fox Vo Peninsular, etc., Works, 84 Mich. 676~ 
48 N.W. 203; James v. Rapids Lumber Co.~ 
SO La. Anno 717, 23 South. 470, 44 L.R.Ao 81 
and notes; Wolski v. Knapp-Stout & Co., 90 
Wiso 178, 63 N.W. 87." . 
h..7 
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An·d again: 
"Here the warning to be of any value must have 
been sufficiently specific to apprise an 
ordinarily prudent person possessing the ex-
perience of decedent of the nature of the 
change made or the danger to be apprehendedo 
Any other warning would have been quite an 
idle ceremonyo" 
The master must do more than merely speak 
lrly so that the servant can hear o He must also 
! into consideration the servant's age, intelli-
~e, and ability to comprehendo 
The rule is stated in Sadler Vo Lynch, Vao, 
)E(2) 669: 
"The sufficiency of the warning may depend 
upon a number of factors such as the intelli-
gence and experience of the servant and the 
nature of the dangero" 
A similar rule was laid down by the Circuit 
~t in Grant Storage Battery Vo DeLay, 87 F(2) 726 ~ 
.ntiff was et;nployed by the defendant in its 
·age battery company factory in Omaha and he was 
elled to leave his employment by reason of 
~ poisoning o One of plaintiff's grounds for 
igence was an alleged neglect of duty upon the 
of the defendant to warn plaintiff as to the 
er arising from lead poisoningo Defendant 
d to withdraw the issue from the jury on the 
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unds that p1a1nt1tt *aSltully w~rned and 
reciated the danger .. The Supreme Court in 
olding that contention that by ~eason of the 
t that plaintiff wa~ a high school graduate with 
vious experience who could read and who h~d 
eived a letter of instruction warning him of 
. difficulty, stated~ 
"The sufficiency of c~ution, warning, o:r in-
struction of an employee, or its necessity, 
may depend upon a number of factors, in-
cluding the age, intelligence, and experience 
of the employee~ the nature of the danger~ the 
character of the work to which the employee 
is assigned, and other circumstanceso" 
The court, howeverj on the above facts, concluded 
"As has been observed, plaintiff was neither 
young, inexperienced, illiterate, nor lacking 
in intelligenceo" 
"This notice gave him both warning and in-
struction, and with this notice, being of 
mature years and intelligent, he had the same 
knowledge relative to the danger attendant 
upon his occupation which his employer had, 
and this warning or instruction certainly 
gave him reasonable notice of the danger of 
his employment arising from lead poisoningo 
Not only did he understand the notice and in= 
structions, but he claimed in his evidence 
to have heeded them to some extent at leasto" 
It should be appa~ent that when one gives an 
~r or instruction in a language thci,t he knows his 
·ant is unable to understand~ that the giver is 
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.igent. The problem of difference in langu~ge 
the basis of litigation in In Re Panasuka, Masso 
NE 386 o The plaintiff, Panasuka, was injur~d 
.e in the employ of the Tauton Wool Stock Companyo 
,Jinter became embedded in his hand resulting 
~ain, swelling, and an abcess which required a 
;ical operation and dressingo The doctor who 
.ted him presented the bill to the plaintiff 
paid it . The plaintiff sought to recover this 
. n: from the emp layer and its insurance car:rie:r o 
Industrial Accident Board found that the 
.icant was an illiterate foreigner who was 
le to read, write or understand the English 
uage and he had no notice or information as 
ow to proceedo A notice to employees was 
ted in English - was posted in a place where 
employees worked. The insurance carrier 
ended that there was adequate notice and that 
as not responsible o The Supreme Court of 
achusetts rejected this contention, stating: 
"The o b 1 i gat ion to fur n i s h medic a 1 and h o s p i t a 1 
se~vices for the fi&$t two weeks after the 
injury is imposed on the insurer by the express 
words of the Acto This duty must be performe.d 
or reasonable efforts made to that end befor~ 
the statutory obligation is satisfiedo "Furcnish" 
50 
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means to provide or .supplyo Its significanc~ 
may vary with the connection in which it is 
foundo It is used heie to describe a duty 
placed upon an insurer ~especting a workman 
who receives "a personal injury arising out of 
or. in the course of his employmentou Such Bl. 
person manifestly is p~esumed by the Act to 
be under more or l~ss physical disability 2nd 
hence not in hi~ normal condition of ability 
to look out for himselfo The word nfu1rnish" 
in such connection imports something more than 
a p~ssive willingness to respond to a demando 
It implies some degree of active effort to 
bring to the injured person the required 
humanitarian relief. Reasonably sufficient 
provision for rendering the required service 
must of course be madeo Then either express 
notice must be given to the employee or there 
must be such publication or posting of the 
information as warrants the fair inference 
that knowledge has reached the employeeo If 
the insurer had made adequate arrangements fo~ 
the care of those to whom the duty is owed in 
the event of injury, and then by conspicuous 
notices suitably posted in places frequented 
by the employee in a language capable of 
being read by him, has given full information 
of that fact, and directions as to steps to 
be taken by an injured person in order to 
avail himself of these arrangements, a very 
different question would be presentedo Thi~ 
might go a long way toward proving complia~ce 
with the requirements of the statuteo But 
in the case at bar the notice appears not to 
have been of a character to challenge attention, 
although perhaps it might have been enough if 
the employee had been able to read the English 
languageo The insurer has readily accessible 
means for ascertaining the nationality of 
employees insured by it and their degree of 
intelligenceo If among them are those who 
can no t r e ad o :r s p e a k the Eng 1 i s h 1 an g u a g E· " 
this circumstance r~quires g~eater effo~t on 
its part in order to comply with the st~tuteu 
Beers Vo Isaac Prouty Company, 200 Masso 19» 
8 5 N . E . 8 6 4 , 2 0 L o R o A o ( N . S o ) 3 9 , 1 2 8 Am 0 S t 0 
Repo 374o" 
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What is the real difference between the spoken 
the written word? If a notice printed in a 
guage a person cannot re~d is not adequate, how 
an order given in a. language one cannot com-
bend be deemed adequate? 
This is especially true in cases involving the 
ing of orders because the employee has a duty 
give obedienceo 
In Leonidas Vo Gro Northern Ry Coo, 72 P(2) 
7, where a section laborer filed an action for 
Jries, alleging that he was injured by reason 
the negligence of the foreman in ordering him 
:.arry ties without assistance, the court said: 
"Ordinarily, an employ·ee has a right to as~ume 
that he may safely act under the direction of 
the foremano Sorenson Vo Northern Pacific Ry 
Co., suprao In 18 R. CoL. 655, the au thor h£3!.S 
well stated princi2les which we think apply 
to this caseo It is there said: ·•rt is a 
fundamental of the relation of master and 
servant that the servant shall yield obedience 
to the master and this obedience an employee 
may properly accord even when confronted with 
perils that otherwise should be avoided. In 
any case, but more plainly when a command is 
sudden and there is little or no time for 
reflection and deliberatiori, the employee may 
not set up his judgment against that of his 
recognized superiors; on the contrary, he m~y 
rely·upon their advice, assurances and commands, 
notwithstanding m~ny misgivipgs of his owno It 
by no means follows that because he could 
justify disobedience of the order he is barred 
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of recovery for injuries received in obeyingo 
He is not required to balance the degree of 
dang·er and~· d'ecide.whether it is safe for him 
t 0 a~ t !i b u ~' he . ' i s . 'r e'l i e v e d in a. me a s u r e 0 f t h e' 
usual obligation of exercising vigilance to 
detect an~. avoid.da~gero Ordinarily, he may . 
assume that the employer has superior knowledge 
and rely thereQn; especially when the act i~ 
one that could be made safe by the exercise of 
special care on the part of the employero The 
employee may assume that such care will be 
takeno Again, it is a psychological truth 
that employees form a habit of obedience that 
overcomes independent thought and action, 
depriving them of power to exercise intelli-
gence that otherwise would protect them." 
There may be negligence in giving orders or 
:uctionso In this case the negligence was proved 
Lggravated by the incompetency of the roadmaster 
.ve any order due to his inability to speak and 
·stand Spanish. 
The rule as to competency is set forth in 
J. Master and Servant, Section 342~ 
"It is the duty of an employer to select and 
retain competent employees, and when one is 
injured by a fellow employee who, the evidence 
shows» was not competent to perform the service 
in which he was ~ngaged, and the injury to the 
victim was attributable to his incompetency, a 
recovery against the employer may be had~ 
provided it is fu~ther made to appear that the 
employer knew, or is chargeable with knowledge, 
of the incompetency of such fellow employee. 
and that the injured employee did not know, 
actually or constructively of such incompetency. 
Incompetency on the part of the co-employee is 
d!emed to be the equiv~lent of insuffici~ncy or 
defectiveness in respect of an appliance or 
place of working o As has been said: "In a 
sen s e ~ ,_? _ '-'"' -~ I f a m a s t e r 
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knowingly employs servants who are incompetent 
by reason of their habits or otherwise~ he is 
liable for an injury occasioned to a fellow 
servant by their incompetency just as he would 
be liable for an injury caused by a defective 
machine." 
However, it is even more succinctly stated in 
.J., Master and Servant, 352, that an employee 
does not possess the capacity to understand ~nd 
the rules of his superiors, is lacking in general 
ation, or is ignorant of the language that is 
Jmarily employed may be held to be incompetent 
in the rules statedo 
Thus in Pullman Coo v. Ransaw, 203 SW 122, 
aw filed a suit against the Pullman and Texas & 
fie Railway Company for damages suffered by being 
~ally arrested by appellant's watchman, and by 
>n of a gunshot wound. The defendant's watchman 
!jected plaintiff from the car and in so doing 
him, was not able to read or speak the English 
1ageo The court found that both employees had 
~ht to be where they were and that the accident 
llly was caused because neither was able to 
~ the language of the other, and each was 
tg in the 1 ine of duty o The court, in sustaining 
~diet for the plaintiff stated: 
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"We think the incompetence of the watchman is 
made clear in view of the fact that he could not 
speak the ·same language of the porter and in 
connection with their conflicting dutieso 
Ruling Case Law, vol. 18, Po 621 states the rule: 
"If a master knowingly employs servants 
who are incompetent by reason of their habits, 
or otherwise, he is liable for an injury 
occasioned to a fellow servant by their in~ 
competency just as he would be liable for any 
injury caused by a defective machineo" 
"Ignorance of the language customarily employed 
is held to constitute incompetency. Ruling 
Case Law, vol o 18, p. 727, and cases referred to 
under note l9on 
In this case we are not confronted with the 
.em of knowledge or the lack of it on the part 
.e employer, nor are we confronted with the 
em of the fellow servant rule. Charlevois, 
admaster, was in charge of an entire area for 
efendant and entrusted with its proper super-
n, and Charlevois knew and was fully aware of the 
age barrier existing between himself and the 
yees at the time he undertook their active 
1al and direct supervision. 
[t would be a complete absurdity to contend 
in employer can be held liable for the in-
:ency of a menial servant and cannot be held 
! for the incompetency of a superior supervisory 
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ligence is more culpable, ~nd any doubt is 
>lved by Richard Vo Amoskeag Mfgo Coo, 79 N.Ho 380 
Ao 88 o The plaintiff did not speak Englisho 
:he noon hour approached, she, in violation of 
,any rules, left her place of work to go to the 
The defendant's foreman, who was unable to 
.k her language, and who apparently recogni~ed 
she could not understand and did not speak 
ish, attempted to compel her to return to her 
e of duty. In the process, he exerted more 
e than was necessary, and plaintiff sued the 
ndant to recover for her injurieso The employer 
ended that the act of its foreman constituted an 
ult and battery and as a result was without the 
! of his employment, and that consequently it 
tot negligent or liableo The Supreme Court of 
lampshire disagreed, stating: 
"When the plaintiff quitted her work it was 
Smith 9 s duty to call her attention to her viola~ 
tion of the rule of the room and in some way to 
request her to resume her proper place 0 To 
make the request verbally would have been 
ineffective because she did not understand the 
Eng 1 i s h 1 an g u ag e $) the on 1 y 1 an g u a g e he c o u 1 ,,~ 1 • u s e 0 
He was obliged to resort to some other means of 
informing her of his request, as, for inst~nce~ 
by putting his hand upon her and leading or 
56 
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pushing her back to the position she had 
wrongfully lefto The use of some degree of 
physical force might reasonably be found to 
have been authorized by the defendant, and it 
follows, in accordance with the defendant 8 s 
a~gument and the authorities above referred to, 
that the defendant would be liable for the 
excessive and unreasonable force used by Smith 
in the performance of his duty to the defendantou 
It is submitted that appellant was entitled to 
his proposed instructions 13 and 14 to the jury 
that the omission of these instructions seriously 
ardized his right of recovery. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF· ~j 
A NEW TRIAL BY REASON OF THE MISCONDUCT OF A 
JUROR 
At each recess, the court instructed the jury, 
1ant to the provisions of Rule 47K, Utah Rules 
~vil Procedure, which provides as follows: 
"(k} SEPARATION OF JURY. If the jurors are 
permitted to separate, either during the trial 
or after the case i~ submit ted to them, they 
shall be admonished by the court that it is 
their duty not to converse with or suffer them-
selves to be addressed by, any other person 
on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion 
thereon until the case is finally submitt~d 
to them." 
Notwithstanding the p~ovisions of the Rule and 
nstructions of the court, and although the 
at one stage advised the jurors that violation 
e Rule could result in imprisonme.nt, on the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ld day of trial at the noon recess, a brother of 
~or came up the steps from the lower landing to ,· · 
,£ the counsel for the respondent, and asked him 
~~case had gone to the jury. (SoTro 5) Upon 
~ving an answer he then stated: "I know all 
: your case - I have a brother on the jury" o 
~. 5) A few minutes later he expressed concern 
1se his brother seemed to be picked on :railroad 
;0 A private conversation in lowered tones 
!d during which the words "That old Mexican" 
mentioned (SoT:ro S)o Is it not significant 
the appellant was a 63 year old Mexican? A 
lays later when confronted with the witness who 
,v~rheard the conversation, and who identified 
;pea.ker as an attorney, he appeared embarrassed 
:oncerned upon seeing the witness. (S.Tr 7). 
All of this testimony was contained in affidavits 
;worn testimony which was subject to cross 
.nationo The evidence was not denied and 
:fore stands admittedo These facts present the 
~wing questions: (1) How did the juror's brother 
that counsel was trying a railroad case? (2) 
id he know his brother was a juror on a T.ail-
case? (3) How did he know all about the case 
t by '1 I ,, ~, ... " .; ...... ;: ;:;,;-,,---:i:~~s:::J..;,.~~=(g'~~ ~ :6'1 set. forth in 
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own statement, as a result of conversations 
n his brother. (4) Why discuss privately "An 
Mexican"? (5) Why was the juror's brother 
ir~assed and upset upon seeing the witness who 
rd part of the conve::sation? 
It is possible that there is an innocent 
Lanation for all of these highly unusual events~ 
in the absence of any explanation which 
•ondent did not choose to make, it is sub-
:ed that the conversation must stand upon the 
.tted facts and the logical inferences that must 
.educed therefrom. 
In Panko Vo Flintco Co., N.J., 80 A(2) 302, the 
ndant moved for a new trial by virtue of mis-
uct of a juroro The facts as finally adduced 
that a brother in law of a juror had phoned an 
ranee adjustor relative to the question of in-
nee from downstairs while the juror was upstairs 
ing, but did not disclose any of the facts of 
conversation to the juror, although some refer-
to the case was made, namely that the juror was 
lng in the trial of the case, the character of 
:ase, and the names of the parties. The only 
evidence of misconduct of the juror was that 
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~een the brother in law and the juror prior to 
conclusiort of the caseo The brother in law 
isted he had not mentioned insurance to the 
or until subsequent to the termination of the 
ion. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in 
aking of the telephone call from the brother in 
to the insurance adjustor, said this: 
"No rational explanation for the call is 
given, but the inference is inescapable that 
it was made for the purpose of getting in-
formation .. 00 oit is beyond belief that having 
secured the desired information, Smith did not 
give it to his brother in law (the juror), 
during. the considerable time they remained 
together in the house thereaftero" 
In the instant c4se no rational explanation 
given, in fact no explanation whatsoever was 
mo However, when one couples the statements 
'ones' brother with the statement previously 
· by Juror Jones to another juror that he had 
.tives who were lawyers and he knew something 
t the law, and this brother's subsequent em-
assment upon being recognized, the inference 
nescapable that the juror had in fact conversed 
his brother who was an attorney, and that in so 
g he violated the law and the express and direct 
ructions of the courto How could any other 
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renee be drawn? The claim of knowledge was 
led with the statement that he had a brother on 
juryo In the Panko, supra, case, the tri~l 
t as dl'd the trial court here, refused to , 
t a new trial, however, the Supreme Court of 
Jersey had no difficulty with the problem and 
unanimous decision did reverse and did grant 
w trial, stating: 
"It is well settled that the test for deter-
mining whether a new trial will be granted 
because of the misconduct of jurors or the 
intrusion of irregular influence is whether 
such matters could have a tendency to in-
fluence the jury in arriving at its verdict in 
a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs, and 
the court's chargeo If the irregular matter 
has that tendency on the face of it, a new 
trial should be granted without further in-
quiry as to its actual effect. The test is 
not whether t~e irregular matter actually in-
fluenced the result, but whether it had the 
capacity of doing so. The stringency of this 
rule is grounded upon the necessity of keeping 
the .administration of justice pure and free 
from all suspicion of corrupting practicesQ 
It i s sa i d to b e r' imp e r a t i v e 1 y r e q u i r e· d t o 
secure verdicts based on proofs taken openly 
at the trial, free from all danger by extra-
neous influenceso 11 Lamphear Vo MacLean, 176 
App.Div. 473, 162 NoYoSo 432, 434, (N.Y.Appo 
Divo 1916); Gall Vo New York & New Brunswick 
Auto Express Coo, 132 NoJ.L. 466, 468, 40 
A.2d 643 (E&A 1944; in re Phelan, 126 N.JoL. 
410, 411, 19 Ao 2d 792 (Sup .Cto 1941); Den ex 
dem. Cox Vo Tomlin, 19 NoJoLo 76'j 80 (SupoCto 
1842; Consumers Coal Coo Vo Hutchinson, 36 
NoJ.Lo 24, 26, 28 (SupoCt. 1872); Sloan Vo 
Harrison~ 1 N.JoL. 123 (Reprint page 145) 
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,, . 
. (Sup .. C t. . 1 7· 9 2 ) ; In r e . C o 11 in s , 15 ft. o 2 d 9 8 , 
18 NoJo MiSCo 49.2, ·497 (Cape May Co., Cir.Cto 
i940); York v .. Wyman, 115 Me. 353, 98 Ao 1024 
L.R.Ao 1917B, 246 (Me. 353, 98 Ao 1024) L.R A 
i.917B, 246 (Me.Sup.Jtid.Cto 1916); 39 AmJur, 
New T ·r i a 1 S e c t .. 9 6 P . 111 o n 
; submitted that if, as the Supreme Court of 
Jersey said "The fundamental right of tri.~l by 
lr and impartial jury is jealously guarded by 
:ourts", that it had no alternative but to 
: a new trial unless it desired merely to give 
;ervice to a rule and then disregard the same. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had a similar 
.em in Gross Vo Moorej) 73 A(2) 221. In that case 
ourt was confronted with a trial where a juror 
. niece of an insurance adjustoro The insurance 
tor was seen by the jury to have had a conversa-
with the juror as well as with counsel for the 
se. The juror and the adjustor admitted the 
rsation but stated that it related solely to 
Y matters and no contrary evidence was ad-
do A motion for new trial was denied by the 
court again, but again the Supreme Court of a 
1:'· State by an unanimous decision overruled the 
court and granted a new trial, stating: 
'Although there may have been no actual fraud 
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or gross misbehavior on the part of anyone in 
this case, on the facts set forth in the record 
and the adqitional facts admitted at the argument 
before this Court a new trial will be grantedo 
In our opinion, a new trial is required to assure 
a fair and impartial trial in fact as well as 
in appearance, and to preserve the orderly admin-
istration of justice." 
Thus it will be seen that two States having an 
Jt identical problem to the problem at bar have 
~mined that the right to an impartial jury trial 
, fundamental and such a basic and essential 
of the administration of justice that even if 
.ppearance is wrong and even though no actual 
: can in fact be proved, that a new trial should 
·antedo Likewise in Whitehead v. Texas & P. Ry 
84 SW(2) 779, the Supreme Court of Texas had a 
hat similar problem in that a member of the jury 
having stated that he was free from bias or 
dice and in the confines of the jury room made 
Y inflammatory and improper remarks relative to 
tiff and plaintiff's integrityo All of the other 
s testified that the improper remarks did not 
t them or their deliberations in any way and 
they did not consider themo The tenor of their 
ts indicated that they intended to find for the 
iant, and would have found for the defendant not-
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or's vote was not essential or necessary part of 
verdict o Notwithstanding these facts which were 
disputed by evidence, the Texas Court of Appeals 
ersed, stating: 
''We believe it clear that the remarks of Cruce 
referred to constituted reversible error. It 
would be a travesty and a reflection on our 
whole jury system to uphold a verdict tainted 
with such misconduct on the part of a juror who 
is selected upon his assurance that he is free 
of bias or prejudice toward either of the 
partieso And as repeatedly announced in our 
decisions, the verdict is vitiated even if 
only one juror is improperly influenced .. " 
It would seem that the Supreme Court of Calif-
La has in effect adopted a rule slightly different 
n that heretofore laid down by New Jersey, Penn-
1ania and Texas and that the modification may be 
:ed as follows: That a case may have misconduct 
l juror in it but that the decision will not be 
aside solely for that reason unless it appears 
the conduct of the offending juror was essen-
to the verdict finally rendered. Thus we see 
in the case of Walter Vo Avaziam, Calo, 25 
526 a new trial was granted, whereas in the 
of Kritzer v. Catron, 244 P(2) 808 a new trial 
not granted because in the Kritzer case the 
ict was 11 to 1 with the offending juror being 
Ill. wti:J 
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1 lone dissenter, and as a result the dissenter• s 
:e would not have upset or modified the verdicto 
is submitted that this verdict made certain basic 
1umptions that are not necessarily justifiedo It 
:umes, for example, that the arguments of that 
·or did not in fact have effect in the size or the 
unt of the verdicto However, notwithstanding 
t problem under the rule in California as here-
ore set forth, the plaintiff here would be en-
led to a new trial because in this case the 
y was polled and one of the essential votes 
essary to sustain the verdict for the r~spandent 
against the appellant was the vote of the 
ending juror, Joneso 
The effect of the above facts is bolstered by 
idavits of jurors Baessler and Tippets in that 
V show beyond any doubt the manner in which the 
lr, Jones, participated in the formation and 
ltion of the verdict, together with the legal 
lseology and conclusions which he used to 
~ess his views. 
Respondent objected and moved to strike the 
.davits, apparently upon the authority of Wheat Vo 
·W, 2sn nt~' O'l'» 1...~ ... ·-··-- -- examination of the 
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ntents of the.affidavits here discloses that they 
~ no ~ffort to impeach or question the verdict 
r to show the grounds upon which the verdict was 
ndered, nor to show any misunderstanding of fact 
lawo 
The affidavits do not disclose the surmises 
processes of reason of the juror nor do they 
rpo:rt to do soo As a result!) it is respectfully 
lmitted that the affidavits do not come within the 
striction set forth in the Wheat, supra, case and 
lt the ruling of the trial court in excluding 
!m was erroneous o Under the California rule 
is necessary to show the misconduct of the juror 
1 harmful to the appellanto It is submitted that 
affidavits were offered only for the purpose 
showing that the misconduct of the juror, Jones, 
I in fact vitally detrimental to appellant's cause. 
is submitted that the affidavits do. in fact, when 
.sidered in conjunction with the sworn testimony 
ch is not controverted~ show that irreparable 
.age as a result of such misconduct was done to 
appellant by the offending juror. 
The affidavits do not purport to show mis-
d u c t i- - - ..JI ..... ~ 4- t.. -- , ....... , .... - - ':"he m i .s c on d u c t o f 
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e j u r o r , J on e s w a s i n f a c t p r oven b y h i s b r o t h e r 'i 
:II d by his statement at the time the jury was polled.! 
may be that the statements contained in the affi- I 
vits are cumulative, but that does not make the 
idence contained therein incompetento The verdict 
d already been rendered invalid by the acts and 
nversations of Jones outside of the court room 
It must necessarily follow that the request of 
pellant for a new trial on this ground should 
ve been granted on the basis of these undisputed, 
contradicted facts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the appellant ~~ 
s deprived of all of the fundamental rights of a 
ry trial in the above entitled case, because he 
; required to submit his claim for recovery to 
jury that was not advised as to any theory 
>n which the appellant predicated his right or 
Lim for recovery. On the contrary, the only 
:ormation that the jury had relating to the 
:stion as to whether or not the appellant had 
ight to recover damages for his injuries was an 
dequate, improper and incomplete instruction 
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sed solely upon the respondent's theory, if anyo 
is respectfully submitted that the appellant 
entitled to a new trial upon the issues involved 
this law suit and upon the court's failure to 
struct, and for the additional reason that the 
urt erred in refusing to grant a new trial by 
ason of the misconduct of the juror, Joneso 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. C. Patterson of 
Patterson & Kunz 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
